From Nobel Laureate to President: María Corina Machado's Path to Power in Post-Cartel Venezuela

The world watched as María Corina Machado, Venezuela's 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner, made a daring escape from her homeland in December, wearing a disguise and sailing away on a wooden skiff after passing through ten military checkpoints [1]. Her daughter accepted the prize on her behalf in Oslo while Machado remained in hiding, hunted by a regime that has labeled her a terrorist and threatened her with life imprisonment [2]. But Machado's journey to Norway wasn't just about collecting an award—it was about preparing for what comes next.

"Maduro will leave power, whether it is negotiated or not negotiated," Machado declared from Oslo, her first public appearance in nearly a year [3]. The statement wasn't wishful thinking. It was a promise backed by the full weight of the United States government, which has officially recognized her running mate, Edmundo González Urrutia, as Venezuela's legitimate president-elect [4]. And when that transition happens—peaceful or otherwise—Machado won't be a bystander. She'll be Venezuela's Vice President, the second-most powerful person in a government tasked with dismantling one of the world's most entrenched narco-states.

The probability of this scenario unfolding isn't hypothetical. It's a matter of timeline.

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The Cartel Masquerading as a Government

To understand why Machado's ascension to power is increasingly inevitable, you must first understand what Venezuela has become under Nicolás Maduro. This isn't a conventional dictatorship propped up by ideology or military might. It's a criminal enterprise that happens to control a nation's institutions.

On July 25, 2025, the United States Treasury Department took an extraordinary step: it designated the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization [5]. The designation wasn't aimed at some shadowy criminal network operating in Venezuela's jungles. It was aimed at the Venezuelan government itself. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent made the connection explicit: "Cartel de los Soles is a Venezuela-based criminal group headed by Nicolas Maduro Moros and other high-ranking Venezuelan individuals in the Maduro regime" [5].

The cartel's name comes from the sun insignias worn by Venezuelan military officials—the same officials who have corrupted every institution of government to facilitate drug trafficking into the United States [5]. The Treasury Department's press release reads like an indictment of an entire state apparatus: the military, intelligence services, legislature, and judiciary have all been weaponized to move cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine across American borders.

Maduro doesn't just tolerate the drug trade. He runs it. The US State Department confirms that Maduro "helped manage and ultimately lead the Cartel of the Suns" [6]. In 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro and 14 other Venezuelan officials on narco-terrorism charges [7]. The Cartel de los Soles provides material support to both Tren de Aragua—the Venezuelan gang terrorizing American cities—and the Sinaloa Cartel, one of Mexico's most violent drug trafficking organizations [5].

This isn't allegation. It's official US government policy, backed by sanctions, indictments, and military action.

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Trump's Pressure Campaign: Strangling the Narco-State

President Donald Trump has made Venezuela a centerpiece of his second-term national security strategy, and his approach is fundamentally different from previous administrations. Where past presidents imposed sanctions and waited, Trump is deploying kinetic force.

In December 2025, the US military seized a Venezuelan oil tanker off the coast, escalating Washington's pressure campaign against Maduro's primary revenue source [8]. The Trump administration alleges the vessel was part of an "illicit oil shipping network supporting foreign terrorist organizations" [2]. Venezuela's government called it piracy. Trump called it national security.

But the oil seizure is just one front in a multi-domain offensive. The US has conducted strikes on what it describes as Venezuelan drug-smuggling boats, targeting more than 20 vessels and killing at least 100 people [9]. These aren't Coast Guard interdictions. They're military strikes—precision operations designed to cut off the financial lifelines that keep Maduro in power.

The legal justification for these actions flows directly from the Cartel de los Soles designation. By classifying Maduro's government as a terrorist organization engaged in narco-trafficking, the Trump administration has unlocked authorities that would otherwise require Congressional approval or international cooperation. The same legal framework that justified drone strikes against al-Qaeda now applies to Venezuelan drug boats and oil tankers.

Trump's team is also working on "day-after plans" for a post-Maduro Venezuela, with informal conversations already underway about Machado and González leading the transition government [3]. This isn't contingency planning. It's preparation for an outcome the administration views as inevitable.

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The Vice Presidency: Power Without the Target

Here's where the prediction gets interesting: Machado won't be Venezuela's president. She'll be its Vice President.

This distinction matters more than it might appear. Edmundo González Urrutia, a 76-year-old career diplomat, is the internationally recognized president-elect of Venezuela [4]. He won the 2024 election by a landslide according to polling station tallies, though Maduro's government declared itself the victor in what was widely dismissed as a fraudulent count [10]. The United States, European Parliament, and numerous other governments have recognized González as the legitimate winner [4] [11].

Machado was the original opposition candidate, but Venezuela's government barred her from running, accusing her of calling for foreign intervention and labeling her a terrorist [2]. She pivoted to campaigning for González, and when he won, he asked her to join his government as Vice President [3]. She accepted.

"I will be where the Venezuelan people already mandated," Machado told CNN from Oslo. "Our president-elect has asked me to join the government as vice president. So I will accompany him in this new and challenging era that starts—or I would say that has already started" [3].

The vice presidency gives Machado something crucial: operational power without being the primary target. As the public face of Venezuela's opposition, Machado has endured years of threats, surveillance, and assassination attempts. Her children fled the country two years ago for their safety [2]. She hasn't been able to hug or touch anyone for over 16 months [2]. The Venezuelan government has made clear it wants her dead or imprisoned.

But as Vice President under González, Machado gains institutional legitimacy and international protection while sharing the security burden with a president-elect who, as a career diplomat, brings decades of foreign policy experience and global relationships [12]. González provides the diplomatic gravitas. Machado provides the grassroots legitimacy and the moral authority of a Nobel Peace Prize.

It's a partnership designed for survival and succession.

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The Transition Scenarios: Negotiated Exit vs. Forced Removal

How does Maduro actually leave power? There are two primary scenarios, and both are increasingly plausible.

Scenario 1: Negotiated Transition

Machado has publicly offered to sit down with Maduro's team to negotiate a peaceful transition [2]. The offer was rejected, but the door remains open. A negotiated exit would likely involve:

• Immunity guarantees for Maduro and top regime officials to avoid prosecution
• Safe passage to a third country (Russia, Cuba, or Nicaragua are likely destinations)
• Asset protection allowing regime insiders to keep some of their illicitly gained wealth
• Gradual power transfer with international observers ensuring compliance

The appeal of this scenario is obvious: it avoids bloodshed and provides a face-saving exit for Maduro. The problem is that Maduro has already been indicted in the United States on narco-terrorism charges [7]. Any immunity deal would have to navigate the reality that the US government views him as the head of a terrorist organization. Trump's team has shown little interest in letting Maduro walk away quietly.

CNN reported in November 2025 that "there could be a way out, a transition, where he can leave without having to go to jail" [13], suggesting some factions within the US government are open to a negotiated solution. But Trump himself has been far more hawkish, calling Maduro a cartel boss and authorizing military strikes against Venezuelan assets [14].

Scenario 2: Forced Removal

If negotiations fail, the alternative is regime collapse—either through internal fracturing or external pressure. This scenario involves:

• Military defection: Machado has expressed confidence that "the vast majority of the Venezuelan armed forces and police, as soon as the transition begins, will obey orders, guidelines and instructions from superiors who will be appointed by the civil authority duly elected by Venezuelans" [3]. If key military commanders defect, Maduro's grip on power evaporates overnight.

• Economic strangulation: Trump's oil seizures and sanctions are designed to cut off the regime's revenue streams. As cash dries up, Maduro's ability to pay security forces and buy loyalty diminishes. The Treasury Department has explicitly stated its goal is to "deprive Venezuela's Maduro, drug cartel of resources" [15].

• US military intervention: While a full-scale invasion remains unlikely, targeted strikes against cartel infrastructure—similar to the drug boat operations—could expand to include command-and-control facilities, oil refineries, or regime leadership compounds. The legal groundwork is already in place through the Cartel de los Soles designation.

• Internal coup: Maduro's inner circle is composed of narco-traffickers and kleptocrats [16]. If they conclude that Maduro is a liability—that his presence guarantees their eventual prosecution or death—they may remove him themselves to cut a deal with the incoming government.

The most likely outcome is a hybrid scenario: external pressure forces internal fracturing, leading to a negotiated exit that gives Maduro and his top lieutenants a narrow escape route while allowing the broader regime to collapse.

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The Probability Assessment

So what are the odds that María Corina Machado becomes Venezuela's Vice President in the near future?

High probability (75-85%) within 18 months.

Here's why:

Accelerating Pressure: Trump's military and economic campaign is intensifying, not plateauing. The oil tanker seizure in December 2025 marked a new phase of direct confrontation. Each action raises the cost of Maduro's continued rule.

International Consensus: The US, European Union, and most of Latin America have recognized González as president-elect. This isn't symbolic—it means Venezuela's opposition has access to frozen assets, diplomatic channels, and international support that Maduro lacks.

Maduro's Isolation: Russia and China, Venezuela's traditional backers, have provided rhetorical support but little material assistance. Maduro is more isolated now than at any point in his presidency.

Migration Crisis: The Venezuelan exodus—the largest migration crisis in the world—creates overwhelming pressure on neighboring countries and the United States to resolve the root cause [3]. Machado has framed the transition as a migration solution: "Hundreds of thousands of people will come back home" once Maduro is gone [3].

Machado's Legitimacy: The Nobel Peace Prize gives Machado unassailable moral authority. She's no longer just an opposition politician—she's an internationally recognized champion of democracy. That status makes her nearly impossible to dismiss or marginalize.

US Administration Commitment: Trump has made Venezuela a priority, and his team is actively planning for the post-Maduro era [3]. This isn't passive observation—it's active preparation.

The timeline is the variable. A negotiated transition could happen within months if Maduro concludes his position is untenable. A forced removal through economic collapse or military defection could take 12-18 months as sanctions bite and internal fractures widen.

But the direction is clear. Maduro's Venezuela is a narco-state under siege, and the siege is working.

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What Happens After Maduro?

If and when Machado becomes Vice President, Venezuela faces a reconstruction challenge unlike any in modern Latin American history. The country's institutions have been hollowed out by corruption. Its economy has collapsed. Six million Venezuelans—nearly 20% of the population—have fled [3].

Machado and González will inherit a state apparatus controlled by cartel operatives, a military riddled with narco-traffickers, and a population traumatized by years of repression. The transition won't be smooth. Violence is likely as cartel factions fight to preserve their operations. Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan gang that has spread across Latin America and into the United States, won't simply dissolve because Maduro is gone.

But Machado has been preparing for this moment. She's spent over a year in hiding, building networks, coordinating with international partners, and planning the transition [2]. She's ready to govern.

"We are fundamentally focused on how we can ensure that it is an orderly, peaceful transition, where the results of the country's reconstruction are felt as soon as possible by Venezuelans," Machado said from Oslo [3].

The question isn't whether she's capable. It's whether the world is ready for what comes next: a Nobel Peace Prize winner tasked with dismantling a narco-state, backed by a US president willing to use military force to make it happen.

The odds say it's going to happen. The only question is when.

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References

[1] Wall Street Journal. (2025, December). "María Corina Machado's Escape from Venezuela." https://www.wsj.com/

[2] BBC News. (2025, December 11). "Venezuelan Nobel winner tells BBC she knows 'risks' of Oslo trip after months in hiding." https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q5p43qgl1o

[3] CNN. (2025, December 12). "Venezuelan opposition leader says she aims for a peaceful transition after Maduro." https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/12/americas/venezuela-machado-aims-peaceful-transition-maduro-intl

[4] PBS NewsHour. (2024, November 19). "U.S. recognizes Venezuela's opposition candidate González as president-elect." https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-recognizes-venezuelas-opposition-candidate-gonzalez-as-president-elect

[5] US Department of the Treasury. (2025, July 25). "Treasury Sanctions Venezuelan Cartel Headed by Maduro." https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0207

[6] US Department of State. (2025, August 7). "Nicolás Maduro Moros." https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros

[7] Wikipedia. "Cartel of the Suns." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel_of_the_Suns

[8] BBC News. (2025, December 23). "Venezuela accuses US of 'extortion' over seizure of oil tankers." https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd749gqgg11o

[9] BBC News. (2025, December 23). "Venezuela accuses US of 'extortion' over seizure of oil tankers." https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd749gqgg11o

[10] BBC News. (2025, December 11). "Venezuelan Nobel winner tells BBC she knows 'risks' of Oslo trip after months in hiding." https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q5p43qgl1o

[11] European Parliament. (2024, September 19). "Venezuela: MEPs recognise Edmundo González as President." https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240913IPR23907/venezuela-meps-recognise-edmundo-gonzalez-as-president

[12] Nobel Peace Prize. "Edmundo González Urrutia." https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/ballots-not-bullets-the-democratic-pathway-to-peace/edmundo-gonzalez-urrutia

[13] CNN. (2025, November 22). "What would it take for Nicolas Maduro to give up power?" https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/22/americas/venezuela-nicolas-maduro-analysis-latam-intl

[14] New York Times. (2025, November 18). "Trump Team Calls Maduro a 'Cartel' Boss. That Word Matters." https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/18/us/politics/trump-maduro-drug-cartel.html

[15] Reuters. (2025, December 23). "US tells UN it will deprive Venezuela's Maduro, drug cartel of resources." https://www.reuters.com/world/us-tells-un-it-will-deprive-venezuelas-maduro-drug-cartel-of-resources-2025-12-23/

[16] Journal of Democracy. (2025, September 2). "How Venezuela Became a Gangster State." https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/how-venezuela-became-a-gangster-state/